From Production Resources to Peoples Department Stores
A Similar Response by Delaware and Canadian Courts on the Fiduciary Duties of
Directors to Creditors of Insolvent Companies
By Pamela L.J. Huff and Russell C. Silberglied1
In the current environment of increasing scrutiny of corporate behavior after corporate
scandals such as Enron and WorldCom, lawsuits brought by creditors or bankruptcy trustees
against officers and directors have become more common.2 The suits are taking center stage,
particularly on the dockets of courts in the United States, and receive much public attention.
Against this backdrop, two prominent courts -- the Supreme Court of Canada and the
Delaware Court of Chancery -- recently issued widely influential opinions within one month of
each other on the subject of whether and to what extent officers and directors of an insolvent
corporation owe fiduciary duties to creditors. Despite (or perhaps because of, and in an effort to
reign in) the increasing frequency of such suits, both courts held that the concept of fiduciary
duty law should not be used to “fill gaps [in the protection of creditors] that do not exist”.3
This article examines in detail the facts of the Production Resources and Peoples
Department Stores cases and the statutory and legal framework in Delaware and Canada. It then
examines each court’s analysis of the issues of fiduciary duty, duty of care, the business
judgment rule, the impact of insolvency of the corporation and the available remedies for
creditors. It notes the striking similarity in the courts’ approaches to these issues. Specifically, it
notes that where a corporation becomes insolvent, the directors’ primary duty remains to the
1

Pamela L. J. Huff is a partner at Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP in Toronto, Ontario and Russell C. Silberglied is a
director of Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A. in Wilmington, DE. The analysis and conclusions set forth in this
article are those of the authors and not necessarily of Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP nor Richards, Layton &
Finger, P.A. nor their respective clients.
2
See Sabin Willet, “The Shallows of Deepening Insolvency” (2005) 60 The Business Lawyer No. 2 at 549.
3
Production Resources Group, LLC v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 790 (Del. Ch. 2004) [hereinafter Production
Resources]; see also Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461 [hereinafter Peoples
Department Stores].

-2-

corporation itself, just as it did when the company was solvent; but the primary constituency
whose interests are at stake obviously changes, which is a factor that directors must take into
account in making good faith business decisions.

This article then considers whether the

decisions in Production Resources and Peoples Department Stores have opened or closed the
gap on creditor claims against directors and, in such landscape, what advice may be offered to
directors and officers of Delaware and Canadian corporations as to how to operate an insolvent
company and make business decisions given the competing interests of stockholders and
creditors.
The decisions in Production Resources and Peoples Department Stores followed
inconsistent lower court decisions in Canada, varied results in US courts and much academic
commentary as to the scope of director duties and what is appropriate in our societies. Corporate
governance is at the heart of the debate as to the appropriate scope of fiduciary obligations of
directors. Both statute in Canada and common law in the United States and Canada require
directors to act in the best interests of the corporation. While the corporation is solvent, that
“best interest” has been viewed as the best interests of the shareholders, who hold the residual
interest.
Where the corporation has become insolvent, shareholder equity may have minimal or no
value. The residual interest in an insolvency lies with the creditors. To what extent do director
duties shift or expand in an insolvency to recognize the shift in the residual economic interest?
Both the Delaware Court of Chancery and the Supreme Court of Canada determined that there is
no fundamental shift in director duties.
Indeed, notwithstanding that the statutory and/or common law framework for Canadian
and Delaware corporations differ in certain material respects, the Supreme Court of Canada and
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the Delaware Court of Chancery used remarkably similar language in rendering their opinions.
For example, both courts recognized (a) that what is in the “‘best interests of the corporation’
should be read not simply as the ‘best interests of the shareholders,’” but rather “[f]rom an
economic perspective . . . means the maximization of the value of the corporation”4; (b) that the
changing economic fortunes of a company often alter what is in the best interests of the corporate
enterprise;5 (c) that as a result of their becoming the residual risk bearers of the insolvent
corporate enterprise, creditors have remedies through either oppression claims in Canada or
derivative fiduciary duty claims in Canada and Delaware, and the arsenal of fraudulent
preference and conveyance claims;6 (d) that the nature or content of directors’ duties do not
change when a company enters the nebulous “zone of insolvency;”7 and (e) that fiduciary duty
law should not be used to fill in non-existent gaps where other, existing laws already protect
creditors.8
The holdings of these two cases differ in a technical sense, with the Delaware Court of
Chancery reiterating that fiduciary duties are owed to creditors as well as shareholders and the
Supreme Court of Canada holding that no such fiduciary duties are owed to the creditors. The
Supreme Court of Canada recognized a duty of loyalty, if not fiduciary duty, to creditors.
However, both courts emphasized that the primary duty is owed to the corporate enterprise itself
and recognized that upon insolvency, what is in the best interest of the enterprise might change
as does the identity of the residual risk bearers, from the shareholders to the creditors, but the
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duty itself does not shift away from the corporation Thus, it is not clear that, from a practical
standpoint, there is much of a real distinction in the two courts’ holdings, nor in the practical
advice attorneys should give directors of Canadian and Delaware corporations in the aftermath of
Peoples Department Stores and Production Resources.
That, itself, is a welcome development, given the fact so many entities have both
Delaware corporations and corporations organized in a province of Canada among their family
tree.

Delaware has been and continues to be a leading forum in the United States for

reorganizations of insolvent companies and there are an increasing number of cross border
insolvencies involving Delaware and Canadian businesses and operations. Advice to directors of
North American enterprises will have some consistency.
I.

Production Resources: the
Pronouncement of the Issue.

Delaware

Court

of

Chancery’s

Most

Recent

The Delaware Court of Chancery’s November 2004 opinion in Production Resources is
likely the most important pronouncement on the nature of fiduciary duty claims brought by
creditors since the Court of Chancery’s 1991 opinion in Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v.
Pathe Communications Corp.9 Its factual background and legal framework are set forth below to
put the holding into perspective.
A.

Factual Background.10
In 1999, Production Resources Group, L.L.C. (“PRG”) installed computer-controlled

audio systems for NCT Group, Inc. (“NCT”). NCT failed to pay PRG for the equipment.
Presumably because NCT represented that it could not pay the debt, and to avoid litigation, PRG
9
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agreed to enter into a “resolution agreement” with NCT which provided that in lieu of a full cash
payment, PRG would accept from NCT $1,906,221 in cash and 6.7 million shares of NCT stock.
After NCT failed to pay and failed to issue and register the stock, PRG sought and obtained a
judgment in Connecticut state court against NCT in the amount of $2,000,000 plus interest and
costs. PRG thereafter tried, without success, to collect on the judgment in Connecticut.
Thereafter, Carole Salkind, the wife of one of NCT’s ex-directors, supplied NCT with
over $28 million in capital in the form of equity and secured debt, even though she was a legal
secretary without apparent means to account for her ability to fund $28 million of capital. As a
secured creditor, Salkind obtained liens on all of the company’s tangible assets, including the
stock of its subsidiaries. Additionally, eight companies affiliated with the Salkind family were
retained as paid consultants to the company. While Salkind was not technically a controlling
stockholder of NCT, the court noted that she had de facto control over NCT:
To be clear, Salkind is not technically NCT’s controlling
stockholder. Nonetheless, she is undisputedly the primary creditor
of the company. The company has a history of defaulting on her
loans, paying penalties and refinancing them, and her loans have
been procured in exchange for convertible notes and warrants that, if
exercised, would give her more shares of NCT than are currently
outstanding. Furthermore, Salkind allegedly has liens on all the
assets of NCT, including the stock of its subsidiaries. In short, it is
fairly inferable that Salkind, at her will, can assume practical control
over NCT by either exercising her foreclosure rights in default or by
converting and becoming a controlling shareholder. In essence, PRG
fairly alleges that Salkind is NCT’s de facto controlling shareholder
and that her interests are being inequitably favored over PRG’s and
other creditor’s interest by a complicit board.11
Salkind proceeded to use this position of control to attempt to keep the company afloat
and yet not pay the PRG judgment. For example, she made capital infusions into NCT’s
11
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subsidiaries, rather than NCT itself, so that the cash would not be subject to the judgment.
Nevertheless, Salkind took convertible notes from NCT itself as consideration for the cash
advances to its subsidiaries.12 Additionally, the company issued or pledged to Salkind and others
more shares of NCT stock than was authorized by NCT’s charter -- indeed, billions of shares in
excess of what was authorized. Additionally, in violation of Delaware law,13 NCT did not hold a
stockholder meeting for over two years, blaming its inability to afford the proxy materials
associated with an annual meeting. The court also noted that, while failing to pay PRG and
suffering shockingly large annual losses for five consecutive years, the company paid substantial
performance related bonuses to two of its directors.
To protect its rights, PRG filed suit in the Delaware Court of Chancery. In addition to
seeking to appoint a receiver for NCT due to its insolvency,14 PRG alleged that NCT’s directors
had breached their fiduciary duties owed to PRG.

According to PRG, because NCT was

insolvent, its directors owed fiduciary duties directly to creditors and creditors, in their own,
individual capacity, could sue for breach of fiduciary duty.
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B.

Legal Framework in Delaware.
The common law15 duties of directors and officers of a solvent corporation are well

documented and understood. The primary fiduciary duties of corporate directors of a Delaware
corporation are the duties of loyalty, care and good faith.16 The duty of care requires a director
to exercise the degree of care in managing the corporation’s affairs that an “ordinarily careful
and prudent [person] would use in similar circumstances.”17 Prior to making a business decision,
directors must call forth and consider all material information reasonably available to them.18
The duty of loyalty prohibits a corporate director from engaging in self-dealing or usurping
corporate opportunities in the performance of his or her duties as a director.19 A material
financial interest held by a director which conflicts with or is potentially in conflict with the
interests of the company directly implicates this duty. The duty of good faith requires directors
to act in what they honestly believe to be the corporation’s best interest as opposed to any other
interest.20

15

Unlike the federal and common law jurisdictions of Canada, which will be discussed below, the source of
Delaware fiduciary duty law is entirely based on common law, not a statute. See generally 8 Del. C. § 141
(providing that the business and affairs of a Delaware corporation are managed by or under the direction of the
board of directors, but not specifying the manner in which such directors must exercise their fiduciary duties). See
also Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 937 (Del. 2003) (“Taking action that is otherwise
legally possible, however, does not ipso facto comport with the fiduciary responsibilities of directors in all
circumstances.”); id. at 939 (“Delaware corporation law … is based on an enabling statute with the Court of
Chancery and the Supreme Court applying principles of fiduciary duty in a common law mode on a case-by-case
basis.”) (Veasey, C.J., dissenting).
16
See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del. 1986) [hereinafter
Revlon]; Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1221 (Del. 1999).
17
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963).
18
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc. [In re Paramount Comm. Inc. S’holder Litig.], 637 A.2d
34 (Del. 1994); In re Caremark Int’l. Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) [hereinafter
Caremark].
19
See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) [hereinafter Guth] (corporate directors’ fiduciary duty
“requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation [and] demands that there shall be no conflict between
duty and self-interest”).
20
See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1994) [hereinafter Cede].

-8-

In exercising these duties, directors of a Delaware corporation are protected by the
business judgment rule. The business judgment rule is a judicially created presumption in favor
of the non-conflicted (i.e. disinterested) corporate director that “in making a business decision
[he/she] ... acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken
was in the best interests of the company.”21 The Delaware Court of Chancery has held that it is
an “elementary precept of corporation law” that “in the absence of facts showing self-dealing or
improper motive, a corporate officer or director is not legally responsible to the corporation for
losses that may be suffered as a result of a decision that an officer made or that directors
authorized in good faith.”22 This is the case even where the court believes that the board
decision, in hindsight, is “substantively wrong, or... ‘stupid’ ... ‘egregious’ or ‘irrational.’”23 The
business judgment rule can be rebutted by a showing of a breach of the duty of care, loyalty or
good faith.24 Once the business judgment rule is rebutted, the burden shifts to the directors to
prove the transaction was entirely fair.25
It is well settled that the fiduciary obligations of a director of a solvent company are
owed to the corporation.26 Those same fiduciary duties extend to the corporation’s shareholders
who, as proprietors of the business enterprise, are the ultimate beneficiaries of the corporation’s
growth and increased value.27 In contrast, directors of a solvent Delaware corporation owe no
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fiduciary obligation to the corporation’s creditors.28 Delaware courts have routinely rejected
efforts to expand the fiduciary obligations of directors of solvent companies to creditors, finding
that a creditor’s rights are fixed by contract with the corporation.29 Indeed, favoring a creditor
over a shareholder of a solvent Delaware corporation might constitute a breach of the director’s
fiduciary obligations.30
When a Delaware corporation becomes insolvent in fact, the class of constituencies to
whom directors owe duties expands to include creditors.31 While certain non-Delaware courts
have held that corporate directors no longer owe a fiduciary duty to shareholders upon
insolvency, the Delaware decisions are clear that upon insolvency, directors’ fiduciary duties
expand to include consideration of both creditors and shareholders.32 This principle was recently
reinforced by the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, applying Delaware
law, which held that Delaware law requires that “[directors] managing a corporation ‘in the
vicinity of insolvency,’... must consider the best interests of the corporation, and not just the
interests of either creditors or shareholders alone.”33
There are two primary rationales provided for the expansion of fiduciary duties to
include creditors. The first, the trust fund theory, provides that the directors of an insolvent

28
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33
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company hold the company’s assets in trust for the benefit of creditors.34

A second rationale,

the “at risk” theory, contemplates that as a corporation approaches insolvency, corporate
directors may adopt high-risk strategies to save value for shareholders unless they are tasked
with additional duties to creditors.35 In doing so, directors may put creditors, who at that point
are likely the true residual claimants to and beneficiaries of the corporation, at risk if they were
solely charged with maximizing value for stockholders.36
The Credit Lyonnais decision noted that sometimes, the “community of interests that the
corporation represents” will diverge from the best interests of stockholders even when the
company is solvent, if it is in the “zone of insolvency”:
In managing the business affairs of a solvent corporation in the
vicinity of insolvency, circumstances may arise when the right (both
the efficient and the fair) course to follow for the corporation may
diverge from the choice that the stockholders (or the creditors, or the
employees, or any single group interested in the corporation) would
make if given the opportunity to act.37
The court posited an example, in its famous footnote 55, wherein a company had but one
asset -- proceeds from litigation -- and the expected value of the outcome of that litigation is less
than the company’s liabilities, but some possibility of a judgment or a settlement in excess of
liabilities exists. By implying that “the right (both the efficient and the fair) course to follow”38
arguably was to accept a settlement at or higher than the expected value -- thereby assuring
insolvency and no return for the stockholders -- many read this footnote to hold that creditors
34

See, e.g., Bovay v. Byllesby & Co., 38 A.2d 808, 813 (Del. 1944); Asmussen v. Quaker City Corp.,156 A. 180, 181
(Del. Ch. 1931) [hereinafter Asmussen]; American Nat’l Bank of Austin v. Mortgage America Corp. (In re Mortgage
America Corp.), 714 F.2d 1266, 1268-69 (5th Cir. 1983).
35
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affirmatively have the right to enforce fiduciary duties owed to them by filing suit, as long as the
company was in the zone of insolvency.39
C.

The Production Resources Opinion.
1.

The Court’s Dicta Concerning the Zone of Insolvency and the Business Judgment
Rule.

In his opinion in the Production Resources case, Vice Chancellor Leo Strine Jr. analyzed
the underlying basis for the claim by PRG that NCT had breached fiduciary duties to PRG, a
creditor of NCT. In doing so, in what amounts to several pages of scholarly dicta, he first took
issue with the assertion that disgruntled creditors of companies that are solvent but within the
zone of insolvency may affirmatively press claims of breach of fiduciary duties owed to them.
The Vice Chancellor stated that “Credit Lyonnais provided a shield to directors from
stockholders who claimed that the directors had a duty to undertake extreme risk so long as the
company would not technically breach any legal obligations.”40 This shield helps creditors
because “directors, it can be presumed, generally take seriously the company’s duty to pay its
bills as a first priority.”41 The Court stated that the cases that “[s]omewhat oddly ... read [Credit
Lyonnais] as creating a new body of creditor’s rights law”42 are “not unproblematic”.43
The Court noted several fundamental problems in expanding the scope of fiduciary duties
to creditors merely because the company is in the zone of insolvency. First, “[a]rguably it

39

See, e.g., Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Buckhead America Corp. v. Reliance Capital Group, Inc.
(In re Buckhead Am. Corp.), 178 B.R. 956, 968-69 (Bankr. D. Del. 1994) (denying a motion to dismiss because a
complaint alleged that even if the company was not insolvent, it was at least in the zone of insolvency).
40
Production Resources, supra, note 3 at 788.
41
Ibid.
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Ibid. at 787-88.
43
Ibid. at 789-790.
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involves using the law of fiduciary duty to fill gaps that do not exist.”44 The Court noted that
unlike stockholders, creditors can protect themselves with contractual provisions such as
covenants and liens on assets. Moreover, creditors are protected by fraudulent transfer laws,
implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing, and to a certain extent, federal bankruptcy
law.45 The Court therefore concluded:
With these protections, when creditors are unable to prove that a
corporation or its directors breached any of the specific legal duties
owed to them, one would think that the conceptual room for
concluding that the creditors were somehow, nevertheless, injured by
inequitable conduct would be extremely small, if extant. Having
complied with all legal obligations owed to the firm’s creditors, the
board would, in that scenario, ordinarily be free to take economic
risk for the benefit of the firm’s equity owners, so long as the
directors comply with their fiduciary duties to the firm by selecting
and pursuing with fidelity and prudence a plausible strategy to
maximize the firm’s value.46
The Court also took issue with the concept that the constituency to whom fiduciary duties
are owed fundamentally changes when a company is solvent but in the zone of insolvency, on
two different grounds.47

44

Ibid.
Ibid. at 790. It is worth noting that the Court’s observations might not be accurate with respect to all creditors.
For example, tort creditors cannot negotiate covenants, and many trade creditors doing small business with debtors
cannot afford to and do not operate under complex contracts. Additionally, the law of fraudulent transfers only
protects creditors to the extent that the business decision they are challenging in fact was a transfer; if the decision
they are challenging is a failure to act, fraudulent transfer statutes are unhelpful. Contrast this to the statutory
oppression remedy under the business corporations statutes of Canada and its common law provinces and territories,
which the Supreme Court of Canada in Peoples Department Stores relied upon in holding that an additional remedy
for breach of fiduciary duties is unnecessary. The oppression remedy appears to protect creditors in a greater
percentage of circumstances than the ability to negotiate covenants and fraudulent transfer law, but Delaware does
not have an oppression statute.
46
Ibid.
47
Interestingly, despite citing Production Resources with approval on other points, a federal court in Delaware
recently held that in order to maintain suit against officers and directors for breach of fiduciary duty, a liquidation
trust comprised of creditors had the “burden to prove that the Director Defendants owed a duty to the creditors by
proving that Hechinger was operating in the vicinity of insolvency.” Liquidation Trust of Hechinger Inv. Co. v. Fleet
Retail Fin. Group (In re Hechinger Investment Co.), Civ. No. 00-840-SLR, slip op. at 17-18 (D. Del. July 19, 2005)
(emphasis supplied). Given that the discussion of the zone of insolvency in Production Resources was dicta (albeit
45
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First, it noted that the zone “is an admittedly confusing one” to define, and is “not a
simple exercise”, permitting “talented creditors’ lawyers [to] ... press for an expansive view”.48
Coupled with the lenient pleading standards, a legal principle permitting creditors to pursue
claims against directors if the “company is within some imprecise and hard-to-define vicinity of
insolvency” will lead to a proliferation of suits against directors of companies later determined to
be solvent but which survive a motion to dismiss.49 Second, presumably stockholders would not
lose the right to sue directors of a corporation in the zone of insolvency, which means that
directors could be exposed to competing suits arguing for mutually exclusive, indeed polar
opposite outcomes.50

In this regard, the Court noted that while creditors of insolvent

corporations are often referred to as the company’s residual risk bearers, that is not entirely
accurate -- just because a company is insolvent does not mean it cannot, under any
circumstances, turn around and leave some benefit for equity. Creditors have no incentive to
push the company to take a course of action leading to that result -- all they care about is getting
paid as close to full recovery as possible.51
Given this tension, the Court took pains to emphasize that faced with competing creditor
and stockholder goals, the duties of directors run primarily “to the firm and their duty to
responsibly maximize its value, a duty that might require pursuing a strategy that neither the

scholarly dicta), and the many cases that preceded it that referred favorably to the commencement of duties to
creditors upon the company’s falling into the zone of insolvency, it is likely that the concept will continue to
pervade despite Production Resources until a more definitive ruling decides the issue.
48
Ibid. at 790, n.56. See also ibid. at 788, n.52 (“I doubt . . . that there is a magic dividing line that should signal
the end to some, most, or all risk taking on behalf of . . . creditors”).
49
Ibid. at 790, n.56.
50
Ibid.
51
Ibid. at 790, n.57.
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stockholders nor the creditors would prefer.”52 It often is an admittedly difficult task to balance
these competing constituencies and determine what, in fact, is in the best interests of the
corporate enterprise. Thus, the Vice Chancellor stated that he “doubt[s] the wisdom of a judicial
endeavor to second-guess good-faith director conduct in the so-called zone”.53

In a re-

affirmation of the business judgment rule in the context of creditor-initiated suits,54 the Court
questioned: “[a]bsent self-dealing or other evidence of bad faith, by what measure is a court
fairly to critique the choice [of creditor versus shareholder interests] made through an award of
damages?”55
In a recently published law review article, the former Chief Justice of the Delaware
Supreme Court agreed that Production Resources “reaffirms what, in my view, has always been
the law -- that directors who make good faith, careful judgment in the honest belief that they are
acting in the best interests of the corporation should not fear liability.”56
2.

The Holding: Fiduciary Duties Are Owed to Creditors If the Company is
Insolvent, But Creditors Only Have Derivative Standing to Sue.

While the Court’s exploration of the zone of insolvency described above will likely have
long ranging consequences and be cited in cases and articles around the United States, it is all
dicta; the Court itself noted that “[f]ortunately, this case does not require me to explore the
52

Id. (citing Credit Lyonnais, supra note 9 at *34 n.35). See also Geyer, supra, note 28 at 789 (directors should
“choose a course of action that best serves the entire corporate enterprise rather than any single group interested in
the corporation.”).
53
Production Resources, supra, note 3 at 790, n.57.
54
See Angelo, Gordon & Co., L.P. v. Allied Riser Comm. Corp., 805 A.2d 221, 229 (Del. Ch. 2002) (“there is room
for application of the business judgment rule” in suits commenced by creditors); Liquidation Trust of Hechinger Inv.
Co., slip op. at 18 (citing Production Resources for the proposition that “the business judgment rule remains
important and provides directors with the ability to make a range of good faith, prudent judgments about the risks
they should undertake on behalf of troubled firms.”).
55
Production Resources, supra, note 3 at 790, n.57. See also ibid. at 788, n.52 (“the business judgment rule remains
important and provides directors with the ability to make a range of good faith, prudent judgments about the risks
they should undertake on behalf of troubled firms.”).
56
E. Norman Veasey, “What Happened In Delaware Corporate Law And Governance From 1992-2004” (May
2005) 153 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1399, 1430.
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metaphysical boundaries of the zone of insolvency.”57 Instead, the Court held that at least at the
pleadings stage, PRG successfully alleged that NCT was insolvent in fact. Therefore, the Court
applied the “more well-settled line of authority”: “[w]hen a firm has reached the point of
insolvency, it is settled that under Delaware law, the firm’s directors are said to owe fiduciary
duties to the company’s creditors.”58
Unlike allowing creditors to sue a company that merely is in the zone of insolvency, the
Court held that this “uncontroversial proposition ... does not completely turn on its head the
equitable obligations of the directors to the firm itself.”59 After all, both before and after
insolvency, the directors’ focus is to maximize the company’s value, either as a going concern
or, if appropriate, in a sale; “[t]hat much of their job does not change”.60 Rather, insolvency
merely “affect[s] the constituency on whose behalf the directors are pursuing that end.”61 For
example, “poor decisions by management may erode the value of the remaining assets, leaving
the corporation with even less capital to satisfy its debts in an ultimate dissolution”.62 As a
result, “[t]he elimination of the stockholders’ interest in the firm and the increased risk to
creditors is said to justify imposing fiduciary obligations towards the company’s creditors on the
directors.”63
The fact that fiduciary duties are owed to creditors, however, transforms neither the
relationship between any particular creditor and the company, nor the nature of the harm if
directors fail to carry out their duties. The creditor-company relationship is still governed by
57
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contract and other law. Moreover, the Court reaffirmed its holding from a 1931 opinion that “the
mere fact that directors of an insolvent firm favor certain creditors over others of similar priority
does not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty, absent self-dealing.”64
Moreover, and perhaps more central to the Court’s actual holding, the nature of the harm
for breach of fiduciary duties owed to creditors is a harm to the corporation, not to any creditor
individually.65 Thus, a suit for breach of fiduciary duties owed to creditors is a classically
derivative suit. According to the Court, “[t]he reason for this bears repeating -- the fact of
insolvency does not change the primary object of the director’s duties, which is the firm itself.”66
Thus, while “the firm’s directors are said to owe fiduciary duties to the company’s creditors”67
and “the increased risk to creditors is said to justify imposing fiduciary obligations towards the
company’s creditors”68, those duties (as well as duties owed to stockholders) ultimately are
subservient to the duties owed to the corporation itself.69
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The derivative nature of these types of claims has two primary impacts. First, before
bankruptcy, a creditor who wants to commence such a suit must meet all of the typical
requirements of derivative suits. For example, demand must either be refused or excused, and
presumably there could be representative plaintiff issues and continuous ownership (in this case,
indebtedness) requirements.70 However, the Court of Chancery’s holding that these types of
suits are derivative in nature should have much less of an impact on the litigation of such suits
once a bankruptcy case has been filed.71 In a bankruptcy case, a trustee or a debtor in possession
(or a post-confirmation liquidation trust) unquestionably has direct standing to bring causes of
action for breach of fiduciary duties. Further, the creditors committee can also move to obtain
standing to pursue derivative claims.72 In either case, the issue outside of bankruptcy -- certain
disgruntled creditors attempting to challenge the ongoing conduct of a board of directors that
remains in control of the company and to receive damages resulting from that conduct -- is rarely
encountered in bankruptcy adversary proceedings.
The second primary impact of the holding that these claims are derivative in nature is that
directors can be exculpated from liability under certain circumstances -- the subject described
immediately below.
3.

Exculpation of Directors From Personal Liability.

While the Court of Chancery in Production Resources denied a motion to dismiss most
counts of the complaint, it granted pursuant to 8 Del. C. §102(b)(7) the motion to dismiss the
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count which sought damages for breach of the duty of care. Pursuant to section 102(b)(7) of the
Delaware General Corporation Law, a corporation may include in its certificate of incorporation
a provision that exculpates its directors from personal liability “to the corporation or its
stockholders,” for monetary damages for breach of the fiduciary duty of care.73 The statute
makes no express mention of whether such an exculpation clause in a certificate of incorporation
also shields directors from personal liability if the suit for personal liability is filed by a creditor.
Prior to the Production Resources decision, three non-Delaware federal courts had
addressed the issue, and two held that a section 102(b)(7) exculpation clause does not shield
directors from personal liability for suits filed by the corporation’s creditors for breach of the
duty of care or waste of the corporation’s assets.74 Those courts reasoned that the statute did not
specifically mention creditors and therefore did not cover suits filed by creditors.75 Additionally,
they held that a certificate of incorporation is a contract between a corporation and its
stockholders, and not a contract between the corporation and its creditors.76 Thus, according to
those courts, because creditors never contractually agreed to such a provision, the section
102(b)(7) exculpation clause is not enforceable against such creditors.
In Production Resources, the Court of Chancery held that a section 102(b)(7) exculpation
clause does protect directors from suits brought by creditors. The holding was guided by the
Court’s decision that suits by creditors for breach of fiduciary duties by directors are derivative
in nature. Thus, even when a creditor derivatively prosecutes such a suit, it is the corporation’s
73
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claim. Therefore, it fits within the literal wording of section 102(b)(7): “to the corporation or its
stockholders.” (emphasis added).
In addition to fitting within the literal wording of the section 102(b)(7), the Court of
Chancery also held that the legislative policy behind section 102(b)(7) would be frustrated if the
Court of Chancery were to follow the Pereira and Steinberg decisions. It has long been noted
that the policy behind the enactment of section 102(b)(7) was to encourage talented individuals
to serve as directors of Delaware corporations, free from fear that they would be held personally
liable if their good faith decisions later turned out to have been poor ones.77 Thus, if the Court of
Chancery were to hold that directors might have to pay out-of-pocket damages to creditors who
challenged their good faith, disinterested decision making, a section 102(b)(7) exculpation clause
would be essentially gutted and ineffective at the time it is most needed. After all, the court
reasoned, suits are most likely to be filed when there is a reason to second guess the directors
because the company’s fortunes turned out poorly, and therefore that is when directors need the
protections of section 102(b)(7) the most.
Production Resources has already been followed by the United States District Court for
the District of Delaware (the “District Court”). In Star Telecommunications, the District Court
held that Production Resources is the law of Delaware that should be followed when deciding
issues involving section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law.78 Additionally,
although neither section 102(b)(7) nor the corporation’s charter were mentioned in the complaint
filed by the official committee of unsecured creditors, the District Court invoked section
102(b)(7) as a defense on a motion to dismiss the case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
77
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78
Star Telecommunications, 2004 WL 2980736, at *11.

- 20 -

Procedure 12(b)(6). This holding is for the most part consistent with the Delaware Supreme
Court’s holding that a case can be dismissed at the pleadings stage by invoking a section
102(b)(7) clause, albeit introducing this outside document converts the motion to dismiss to one
for summary judgment; despite the conversion, a plaintiff cannot take discovery on the 102(b)(7)
clause unless it has a good faith basis to challenge its authenticity or the propriety of its
adoption.79
Thus, Star Telecommunications makes it clear that if a Delaware corporation’s certificate
of incorporation contains a section 102(b)(7) exculpation clause, the holding of Production
Resources is applicable in suits brought in the bankruptcy court. Accordingly, directors are
shielded from personal liability for monetary damages for breach of their duty of care regardless
of whether such suits are initiated by the corporation, stockholders, creditors or an official
committee of unsecured creditors. On June 30, 2005, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed, reversing Pereira and citing Production Resources with approval.80 In so holding, the
Second Circuit confirmed that (a) suits brought by bankruptcy trustees also are governed by
section 102(b)(7), and (b) that courts outside of Delaware will look to Production Resources as
the authority to apply when confronted with these issues.
II.

Peoples v. Wise:
Creditors.

the Supreme Court of Canada Addresses Director Duties to

The principal question raised before the Supreme Court of Canada in Peoples
Department Stores is whether directors of a corporation owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation’s
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creditors comparable to the statutory duty owed to the corporation. Although the Court put the
question before it in such simple terms and decided that no such fiduciary duty exists, it took the
opportunity, as did the Delaware Court, to explore in dicta the duties and responsibilities of
directors of both solvent and insolvent corporations.
The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada was released in late October 2004.
Although the Court did not have the benefit of the decision in Production Resources, it
considered the U.S. approach to the “best interests of the corporation”, “the trust doctrine”, and
the “business judgment rule”. It cited with favour an article co-authored by Vice Chancellor Leo
Strine, Jr., “Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware
Corporation Law”, who was about to release his opinion in Production Resources.81 Like the
Delaware Court, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that the primary duty of the directors is to
act in the best interests of the corporation.
A.

Factual Background
Wise Stores Inc. (“Wise”) was founded by Alex Wise in 1930 as a small clothing store in

Montreal, Quebec. By 1992, through internal growth and acquisitions, it had become a publicly
traded company operating 50 locations with annual sales of approximately $100 million. The
stores were, for the most part, located in urban areas in Quebec. The founder’s three sons,
Lionel, Ralph and Harold Wise (the “Wise brothers”), were majority shareholders, officers, and
directors of Wise. Together, they controlled 75 percent of the firm’s equity.
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In 1992, Peoples Department Stores (“Peoples”) had been in business continuously in one
form or another for 78 years. It had operated as an unincorporated division of Marks & Spencer
Canada Inc. (“M & S”) until 1991, when it was incorporated as a separate company. M & S
itself was wholly owned by the large British firm, Marks and Spencer plc (“M & S plc”).
Peoples’ 81 stores were generally located in rural areas, from Ontario to Newfoundland. Peoples
had annual sales of about $160 million, but was struggling financially. Its annual losses were in
the neighborhood of $10 million.
By late 1991, M & S plc, the British parent company of M & S, had decided to divest
itself of all its Canadian operations. Wise was the longtime interested purchaser of M & S and a
deal was reached.
Wise incorporated a company, 2798832 Canada Inc., for the purpose of acquiring all of
the issued and outstanding shares of Peoples from M & S. The parties entered into a share
purchase agreement, with a purchase price of $27 million.
The amount of the down payment due to M & S at closing, $5 million, was borrowed
from the Toronto Dominion Bank (the “TD Bank”). According to the terms of the share
purchase agreement, the $22-million balance of the purchase price would be carried by M & S
and would be repaid over a period of eight years. Wise guaranteed all of the obligations of
2798832 Canada Inc. pursuant to the terms of the share purchase agreement.
To protect its interests, M & S took a security interest over the assets of Peoples (subject
to a priority in favour of TD Bank) and negotiated strict covenants concerning the financial
management and operation of the company. In particular, Peoples could not be amalgamated
with Wise until the purchase price had been paid. This prohibition, in addition to others, was
presumably intended to induce Wise to refinance and pay the remainder of the purchase price as
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early as possible in order to overcome the strict conditions imposed upon it under the share
purchase agreement.
On January 31, 1993, 2798832 Canada Inc. was amalgamated with Peoples. The new
entity retained Peoples’ corporate name. Since 2798832 Canada Inc. had been a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Wise, upon amalgamation, the new Peoples became a subsidiary directly owned
and controlled by Wise. The Wise brothers were Peoples’ only directors.
Following the acquisition, Wise attempted to rationalize its operations by consolidating
the overlapping corporate functions of Wise and Peoples. The joint operation of Wise and
Peoples did not function smoothly.
Parallel bookkeeping combined with shared warehousing arrangements caused serious
problems for both Wise and Peoples. Both the Wise’ and Peoples’ stores experienced numerous
shipping disruptions and delays, and inventory records were incorrect and unreliable.
To address the problems, the Wise brothers agreed that they would implement a joint
inventory procurement policy (the “new policy”) whereby the two companies would divide
purchasing responsibility. Peoples would make all purchases from North American suppliers
and Wise would make all purchases from overseas suppliers. Peoples would then transfer to
Wise what it had purchased for Wise from North American suppliers, charging Wise
accordingly. Similarly, Wise would transfer to Peoples what it had purchased for Peoples from
overseas suppliers, charging Peoples accordingly.

Approximately 82 percent of the total

inventory of Wise and Peoples was purchased from North American suppliers, which inevitably
meant that Peoples would be extending a significant trade credit to Wise.
The new policy was implemented on February 1, 1994. The new policy was the cause of
the claims against the Wise brothers following the collapse of the businesses.
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By June 1994, financial statements prepared to reflect the financial position of Peoples as
of April 30, 1994 revealed that Wise owed more than $18 million to Peoples. M & S was
concerned about the situation and insisted that the new policy be rescinded. An agreement was
executed on September 27, 1994, effective July 21, 1994, which provided that the new policy
would be abandoned as of January 31, 1995. The agreement also specified that the inventory
and records of the two companies would be kept separate, and that the amount owed to Peoples
by Wise would not exceed $3 million.
In September 1994, in light of the fragile financial condition of the companies and the
competitiveness of the retail market, the TD Bank announced its intention to cease doing
business with Wise and Peoples as of the end of December 1994. Following negotiations,
however, the TD Bank extended its financial support until the end of July 1995.
In December 1994, the Wise brothers presented financial statements showing
disappointing results for Peoples in its third fiscal quarter. Three days later, M & S initiated
bankruptcy proceedings against both Wise and Peoples. A notice of intention to make a proposal
was filed on behalf of Peoples the same day. Nonetheless, Peoples later consented to the petition
by M & S, and both Wise and Peoples were declared bankrupt on January 13, 1995, effective
December 9, 1994.
The assets of Wise and Peoples were sufficient to cover in full the outstanding debt owed
to TD Bank, satisfy the entire balance of the purchase price owed to M & S, and discharge
almost all the landlords’ lease claims.

The bulk of the unsatisfied claims were those of

unsecured trade creditors.
Following the bankruptcy, Peoples’ trustee filed a petition against the Wise brothers. In
the petition, the trustee claimed that they had favoured the interests of Wise over Peoples to the
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detriment of Peoples’ creditors, in breach of their duties as directors under s. 122(1) of the
Canada Business Corporations Act (“CBCA”).82
The Quebec Superior Court found the Wise brothers liable under the CBCA and held that
directors’ duties under s.122 of the CBCA, which require them to take reasonable care and to act
in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation, are owed to creditors in the
vicinity of insolvency.83 The Quebec Superior Court found that the Wise brothers breached that
duty. The Wise brothers appealed. The Quebec Court of Appeal allowed the appeal.84 It was
not persuaded by considerable precedent from other jurisdictions suggesting that such duty
shifted to creditors of insolvent or “near insolvent” businesses. The Trustee obtained leave to
appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.85
These decisions set off an intense academic debate as to the scope of director duties in
Canada and the extent to which they do or do not or should or should not shift to different
stakeholders when a company is insolvent or in the vicinity of insolvency. The matter has now
been settled by the Supreme Court of Canada, with obiter remarkably similar to that of the
Delaware Court.
B.

Legal Framework In Canada
The case came before the Supreme Court of Canada on the issue of whether directors owe

a duty to creditors under the CBCA. As described above, the duties of directors of Delaware
corporations are established by common law. Duties of directors of corporations incorporated
82
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federally under the CBCA or under the business corporations statutes of the common law
provinces and territories of Canada are set out in the respective business corporations statutes.
That directors must satisfy a duty of care is a long standing principle of the common law in
Canada, although the duty of care has been reinforced by statutes that set more demanding
standards.86 The appeal before the Supreme Court of Canada focussed on the statutory rather
than the common law duties owed by directors.87
Subsection 122(1) of the CBCA establishes two distinct duties to be discharged by
directors and officers in managing, or supervising the management of, the corporation:
“122(1) Every director and officer of a corporation in exercising their
powers and discharging their duties shall
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the
corporation; and
(b) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person
would exercise in comparable circumstances.”88

The Supreme Court of Canada reviewed these duties and their availability to creditors. It
did so in the context of Canadian corporate law. As the common law requires in Delaware89,
directors in Canada by both statute and common law must act honestly and in good faith, with
due care, diligence and skill. They must respect the confidence and trust that have been reposed
in them to manage the assets of the corporation in pursuit of its objects. They must avoid
conflicts of interest with the corporation.

86

They must avoid abusing their position to gain

Peoples Department Stores, supra, note 3 at 489.
Ibid. at 481.
88
For similar provisions in provincial legislation, see for example, Alberta Business Corporations Act, R.S.A. 2000,
c. B-9, s. 122; Manitoba The Corporations Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. C225, s. 114(2), (3); Ontario Business Corporations
Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B. 16, s. 134.
89
See discussion at Part I.B, above.
87

- 27 -

personal benefit. They must serve the corporation selflessly, honestly and loyally.90 If they fail
to do so, they may be held accountable by the corporation itself or by its trustee in bankruptcy, or
through a derivative action by shareholders or creditors. Any deference to business judgment is
to be accorded only when directors have made a decision and exercised their judgment in an
informed and independent fashion, after a reasonable analysis of the situation and acting on a
rational basis with reasonable grounds.91
One of the distinctive features of Canadian corporate law is the availability of the
oppression remedy, in addition to derivative claims for breach of director duties which are also
available in the United States. The oppression remedy changes considerably the landscape for
director duties in Canada, as compared to the United States.
Section 241(2) of the CBCA (and similar provisions of business corporation statutes in
the common law provinces)92 allows a “complainant” to apply to the court for an order if:
the court is satisfied that in respect of a corporation or any of its affiliates
(a) any act or omission of the corporation or any of its affiliates effects a
result,
(b) the business or affairs of the corporation or any of its affiliates are or
have been carried on or conducted in a manner, or
(c) the powers of the directors of the corporation or any of its affiliates
are or have been exercised in a manner
that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards the
interests of any security holder, creditor, director or officer, the court
may make an order to rectify the matters complained of.
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A “complainant” is defined as a security holder or former security holder, a director and
officer or a former director and officer, the Director appointed by the government to administer
the statute, or “any other person who, in the discretion of the Court, is a proper person to make
an application”.93
The Court has extremely broad powers under s. 241(3) of the CBCA to make such orders
it thinks fit if it concludes that oppressive conduct has occurred. For instance, the court may
make interim or final orders:
(i) restraining the conduct complained of;
(ii) appointing a receiver or receiver-manager;
(iii) liquidating and dissolving the corporation; and
(iv) compensating an aggrieved person.

Much of the litigation under the oppression remedy concerns disputes between majority
and minority shareholders in closely held corporations. However, it has also been used to grant
relief to creditors as well as shareholders, including orders compensating aggrieved creditors for
the oppressive conduct of directors. The fact that creditors’ interests increase in relevancy as a
corporation’s finances deteriorate is apt to be relevant to, inter alia, the exercise of discretion by
a court in granting standing to a creditor as a complainant invoking the oppression remedy.94
The Supreme Court of Canada noted in Peoples Department Stores the particular
Canadian corporate law landscape;
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The Canadian legal landscape with respect to stakeholders is unique.
Creditors are only one set of stakeholders, but their interests are
protected in a number of ways. Some are specific, as in the case of
amalgamation: s. 185 of the CBCA. Others cover a broad range of
situations. The oppression remedy of s. 241(2)(c) of the CBCA and the
similar provisions of provincial legislation regarding corporations grant
the broadest rights to creditors of any common law jurisdiction: see D.
Thomson, “Director, Creditors and Insolvency: A Fiduciary Duty or a
Duty Not to Oppress?” (2000), 58 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 31, at p. 48. One
commentator describes the oppression remedy as “the broadest, most
comprehensive and most open-ended shareholder remedy in the common
law world”: S.M. Beck, “Minority Shareholders’ Rights in the 1980s” in
Corporate Law in the 80s (1982), 311, at p. 312. While Beck was
concerned with shareholder remedies, his observation applies equally to
these of creditors.
The fact that creditors’ interests increase in relevancy as a corporation’s
finances deteriorate is apt to be relevant to, inter alia, the exercise of
discretion by a court in granting standing to a party as a “complainant”
under s. 238(d) of the CBCA, as a “ proper person” to bring a derivative
action in the name of the corporation under ss. 239 and 240 of the
CBCA, or to bring an oppression remedy claim under s. 241 of the
CBCA.95

The two instruments, statutory director duties and the oppression remedy, are aimed at
different kinds of conduct, although the facts in a particular case may give rise to breaches of
both.96 Within this corporate landscape, the Court considered the statutory duties of directors
under s. 241 of the CBCA.

C.

The Decision in Peoples Department Stores
The Court considered s. 122(1)(a) and s. 122(1)(b) of the CBCA as creating two distinct

duties, designed to secure different ends, which had to be addressed separately. The first duty
was referred to in the Peoples Department Stores case as the “fiduciary duty”, the duty under s.
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122(a) to act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation. The
Court held that it is better described as the “duty of loyalty”, incorporating American
terminology.

However, throughout its decision, the Court used the expression “statutory

fiduciary duty” for purposes of clarity when referring to this duty under the CBCA.
The second duty was referred to in the Peoples case as the “duty of care”, the duty under
s. 122(b) to “exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would
exercise in comparable circumstances”. Generally speaking, this “duty of care” imposes a legal
obligation upon directors and officers to be diligent in supervising and managing the
corporation'
s affairs.97
The following is a summary of the consideration by the Supreme Court of Canada of
these two duties.

1.

The Statutory Fiduciary Duty: Section 122(1) (a) of the CBCA

The statutory fiduciary duty requires directors and officers to act honestly and in good
faith in respect of the corporation.98 The Supreme Court of Canada described such duty of the
directors as one to maximize the value of the corporation:
Insofar as the statutory fiduciary duty is concerned, it is clear that the
phrase the “best interests of the corporation” should be read not simply
as the “best interests of the shareholders”. From an economic
perspective, the “best interests of the corporation” means the
maximization of the value of the corporation… 99

The Court stated that, in determining whether they are acting with a view to the best
interests of the corporation, it may be legitimate, given all the circumstances of a given case, for
97
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the board of directors to consider, inter alia, the interests of shareholders, employees, suppliers,
creditors, consumers, governments, and the environment.100
However, at all times, directors and officers owe a fiduciary obligation to the corporation.
The interests of the corporation are not to be confused with the interests of the creditors or those
of any other stakeholder, although those interests fall within the consideration of the directors in
seeking to maximize the value of the corporation.101
Unlike the Delaware Court, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that the statutory
fiduciary duty does not extend to creditors. However, like the Delaware Court and using similar
language, it dismissed the concept of any shifting duties when a corporation is in the vicinity of
insolvency. It recognized that there will be various shifts in interest that naturally occur as a
corporation’s fortunes rise and fall, without altering the fiduciary duty of the directors:
The directors’ fiduciary duty does not change when a corporation is in
the nebulous “vicinity of insolvency”. That phrase has not been defined;
moreover, it is incapable of definition and has no legal meaning. What it
is obviously intended to convey is a deterioration in the corporation'
s
financial stability. In assessing the actions of directors it is evident that
any honest and good faith attempt to redress the corporation'
s financial
problems will, if successful, both retain value for shareholders and
improve the position of creditors. If unsuccessful, it will not qualify as a
breach of the statutory fiduciary duty.102

In Production Resources, Vice Chancellor Strine described the “zone of
insolvency” as an “admittedly confusing one” to define and “not a simple exercise.”103 The
Supreme Court of Canada took this concept to its logical conclusion and declared the “zone of
insolvency” to be “incapable of definition” and as having “no legal meaning”.
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Vice Chancellor Strine held that the “fiduciary duty of directors should not be
used to fill gaps that do not exist. The Supreme Court of Canada found no gap to fill as well:
In light of the availability both of the oppression remedy and of an action
based on the duty of care, which will be discussed below, stakeholders
have viable remedies at their disposal. There is no need to read the
interests of creditors into the duty set out in s. 122(1)(a) of the CBCA.
Moreover, in the circumstances of this case, the Wise brothers did not
breach the statutory fiduciary duty owed to the corporation.104

The Court found that the Wise brothers did not breach their statutory fiduciary
duty. In seeking to maximize the value of the corporation, the Court described the statutory
fiduciary duty of directors as the pursuit of “a better corporation”. In 820099 Ontario Inc. v.
Harold E. Ballard Ltd.,105 Mr. Justice Farley held that, in resolving a conflict between majority
and minority shareholders, it is safe for directors to act to make the corporation “a better
corporation”. 106 The Supreme Court of Canada adopted that same expression and found that the
Wise brothers did not breach their statutory fiduciary duty in seeking to make both Wise and
Peoples “better corporations”.107
2.

The Statutory Duty of Care: Section 122(1) (b) of the CBCA

Unlike the fiduciary duty in s.122(1)(a) of the CBCA, which specifies that directors and
officers must act with a view to the best interests of the corporation, the Court commented that
the duty of care in s. 122(1)(b) of the CBCA does not specifically refer to an identifiable party as
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the beneficiary of the duty. Importantly, the Court stated that the identity of the beneficiary of
this duty is much more open ended and it appears “obvious” that it must include creditors.108
The statutory duty of care under s.122(1)(b) is characterized as an “objective standard”,
what a reasonably prudent person would do in comparable circumstances, and the factual aspects
of the circumstances surrounding the actions of the director or officer are important.109
As in Delaware, deference is given to the directors under the business judgment rule.
The Court held as follows:
The contextual approach dictated by s. 122(1)(b) of the CBCA not only
emphasizes the primary facts but also permits prevailing socio-economic
conditions to be taken into consideration...Canadian courts, like their
counterparts in the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and
New Zealand, have tended to take an approach with respect to the
enforcement of the duty of care that respects the fact that directors and
officers often have business expertise that courts do not. Many decisions
made in the course of business, although ultimately unsuccessful, are
reasonable and defensible at the time they are made. Business decisions
must sometimes be made, with high stakes and under considerable time
pressure, in circumstances in which detailed information is not available.
It might be tempting for some to see unsuccessful business decisions as
unreasonable or imprudent in light of information that becomes available
ex post facto. Because of this risk of hindsight bias, Canadian courts
have developed a rule of deference to business decisions called the
“business judgment rule”, adopting the American name for the rule.110

A director and officer will not be held in breach of the duty of care under s.122(1)(b) of
the CBCA if they act prudently and on a reasonably informed basis:
The decisions they make must be reasonable business decisions in light
of all the circumstances about which the directors or officers knew or
ought to have known. In determining whether directors have acted in a
manner that breached the duty of care, it is worth repeating that
perfection is not demanded. Courts are ill-suited and should be reluctant
to second-guess the application of business expertise to the
108
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considerations that are involved in corporate decision making, but they
are capable, on the facts of any case, of determining whether an
appropriate degree of prudence and diligence was brought to bear in
reaching what is claimed to be a reasonable business decision at the time
it was made.111

The court was clear. “Perfection is not demanded”. Rather, the decisions made by the
directors must be reasonable business decisions in light of all the circumstances about which the
directors knew or ought to have known.
The Court found that the Wise brothers, in exercising their business judgment, met the
requisite standard of “a reasonable business decision” based on the business judgment rule and
did not breach the duty of care.112

D.

Opening or Closing the Gap on Creditor Claims Against Directors?
The Supreme Court of Canada clarified the fiduciary duties of directors of Canadian

corporations, as did the Delaware Court of Chancery in its jurisdiction. Directors of corporations
do not owe a separate fiduciary duty to creditors of a corporation in an insolvency situation. In
Delaware, there is a fiduciary duty to creditors, but duties do not shift to creditors in an
insolvency scenario, but rather expand to include shareholders and creditors. The nature of the
duties do not change. In Canada, there is no such statutory fiduciary duty owed to the creditors,
whether the corporation is solvent or not. The duty remains to the corporation and does not shift
in an insolvency.
In considering the s. 122 (b) “duty of care”, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that such
duty extends to creditors. To what extent does such statement in obiter open the floodgates for
111
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claims by creditors against directors? The Court acknowledged that the civil law serves as a
supplementary source of law to federal legislation such as the CBCA. Otherwise, the Court
states that “the CBCA does not entitle creditors to sue directors directly for their breach of
duties”.113 The Court relied on specific provisions of the Quebec Civil Code that gave creditors a
right to bring an action for alleged breaches of statutory duties of care in Quebec. Article 1457
of the Quebec Civil Code requires a person to abide by rules of conduct imposed on him by
“circumstances, usage or law, so as not to cause injury to another”.114
There are no similar statutory provisions in the common law provinces and territories of
Canada. The Supreme Court of Canada did not indicate in its reasons to what extent the s.
122(b) “duty of care”, although it extends to creditors, could be actionable by creditors in
common law jurisdictions. Directors may be sued for breach of such duty by the corporation (or
the trustee in bankruptcy of the corporation for the benefit of the creditors). The cause of action
of the corporation against the directors could be taken up derivatively by the creditors or other
stakeholders of the corporation, if the proper steps are taken. Section 239 of the CBCA permits a
“complainant”115 to apply to a court for leave to bring an action in the name and on behalf of a
corporation for the purpose of prosecuting the action on behalf of the body corporate. The
complainant may be a creditor, if considered by the court to be a proper person to make the
application.
Which leaves open the question: has Peoples Department Stores opened the floodgates
for claims against directors or not?
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One suspects that the Supreme Court of Canada did not think it was opening the
floodgates by denying a fiduciary duty to creditors and, while acknowledging a duty of care,
relying on the Quebec Civil Code in order to make it actionable by a creditor. It made no
accompanying common law analysis.

To the contrary, it stated that in light of both the

availability of the oppression remedy and of an action based on duty of care (derivatively if not
directly, other than in Quebec), there was no need from a policy point of view to give creditors
more than they already have by expanding the more onerous statutory fiduciary duties of
directors to creditors. The answer will be in the future application of the Peoples Department
Stores case.
III.

Advice for Directors of an Insolvent Company
Advice to directors of an insolvent business on either side of the border is the same.

Directors have taken on the task of attempting to maximize the “value” of the corporation. In
doing so, they must act prudently and on a reasonably informed basis and in the best interests of
the corporation, without conflict and without regard to any outside or personal interest of such
director. Courts will not interfere with the proper exercise of business judgment.
Some may say this puts the bar quite low for director conduct. As long as a director is
acting honestly and reasonably, and without conflict, his or her judgment need not be perfect.
Deference to business judgment provides protection for errors in judgment, but does not shield
directors from liability for negligence or lack of due diligence in the decision making process.
Upon insolvency, or perhaps near insolvency, it is clear from an economic standpoint that
in calling forth sufficient information to enable themselves to act in the best interests of the
corporate enterprise itself on a reasonably informed basis, directors should strive to understand
what is in the best interests of creditors, who in essence are the residual risk bearers of the
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corporation at that juncture. This is not to say that directors must pay heed only to what creditors
desire: it is clear in Canada that no fiduciary duty is owed to the creditors, and in Delaware, a
fiduciary duty is owed to both stockholders and creditors. However, understanding the realities
of a company’s economic situation and its options likely is the key to business decision making
in an insolvency scenario, and thus a directors’ duty of care to the corporate enterprise itself
might well be judged by his or her understanding of the economic realities and the thought he or
she gives to the range of options available to the corporation and their impact on all
constituencies, including creditors.
When viewed in this light, the recognition in Production Resources of fiduciary duties to
creditors of insolvent corporations and the rejection of such a concept in Peoples Department
Stores should not effect the standard for corporate decision making in Delaware and Canada.
Rather, the largest affect of Production Resources should be in after-the-fact litigation and who
has standing to bring litigation. Standing is found in Canada through derivative claims and the
oppression remedy and in Quebec, directly through the Quebec Civil Code. However, the great
majority of such litigation is pursued after a bankruptcy case has been filed, by a trustee in
bankruptcy for the benefit of the creditors. At such point, standing is typically no longer an
issue.116 As a result, the existence or non-existence of a fiduciary duty to creditors is likely a
distinction with no practical difference.
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